Modern Statutory Interpretation: Meaning of Words

Modern Statutory Interpretation: Meaning of Words

The process of statutory construction whereby a Court ascertains the “ordinary and natural meaning” of words in a statutory text is one in which the everyday meaning of those words are considered within their legislative context. It is therefore, an assessment divided into two parts: (1) the popular use and definition of the words in their social situ are established; and, (2) the legislative purpose is applied to these words to determine their function within the relavent. This second part is evinced where the legislature intends to depart from the everyday meaning of words or, where the ordinary and natural meaning includes a range of meanings and the Court must determine which of those is intended. This process is more eloquently described by Campbell JA in Thomas v State of New South Wales [2008] NSWCA 316 at [22] in terms of the “hermeneutic circle”:

“That concept is that understanding of the parts is dependent upon understanding the larger whole, but the larger whole can only be understood on the basis of the parts, so that arriving at an understanding of any particular part involves movement to and fro between the parts and the whole.”

This involves a consideration of the purpose the statute, the legal milieu in which it exists, and the type of activity it seeks to regulate. Yet, as has been frequently repeated, legislative purpose is “ultimately derived objectively from the language in which the law is expressed”: Commonwealth v Yarmirr [2001] HCA 56 at [262]. As Dawson J held in Mills v Meeking (1990) 169 CLR 214 at 235 a modification of the statutory language by reference to the purposes of an Act must be consistent with the wording of that Act. Yet, words are themselves social constructions whereby meaning is dependent on their ordinary and natural use. Thus Kitto J in NSW Associated Blue-Metal Quarries v FCT (1956) 94 CLR 509 at 514 stated that, “in the end the conclusion must depend on one's own understandings of the sense in which words are currently used”. In ascertaining this “sense”, courts frequently have recourse to the same book the rest of us do, a dictionary. As Handley JA stated in Manly Council v Malouf t/as Fusion Point (2004) 61 NSWLR 394 at 396-7, a dictionary “is likely to exercise some influence over the way the definition will be understood by the court.” Yet Mason P in House of Peace Pty Ltd v Bankstown City Council [2000] 48 NSWLR 498 at 505, commented,

“A dictionary may offer a reasonably authoritative source for describing the range of meanings of a word … However, they do not speak with one voice, even if published concurrently. They can illustrate usage in context, but can never enter the particular interpretive task confronting the person required to construe a particular document for a particular purpose.”

This warning is particularly salient where the court has to consider compound expressions–where the individual words that make up the expression may mean something quite different than the expression itself (Collector of Customs v Agfa Gevaert Ltd (1996) 186 CLR 389 at 399-400) and as already noted above, the meaning of words or expressions take their definition from the context in which they appear. This is known as the noscitur a sociis rule: the meaning of a word or phrase is to be derived from its context. Spigelman CJ in Lend Lease Real Estate Investment Ltd v GPT RE Ltd [2006] NSWCA 207 at [30] enunciated the rule as being that, “the general principle of the law of interpretation that the meaning of a word can be gathered from its associated words” and can likewise be limited by them. Illustrative of the issue this rule poses in relation to the use of dictionaries is the statement by Brennan CJ, Dawson, Toohey, Gaudron and McHugh JJ in Collector of Customs v Agfa Gevaert Ltd (1996) 186 CLR 389 at 396-397 where their Honours held that the meaning of a sentence is determined by the meanings of the words within that sentence, yet simultaneously, “the meaning of the individual words of that phrase is bound up in the syntactical construction of the phrase in question.” It is here that the hermeneutic circle described by Campbell JA comes into focus as an activity in which the interpreter ascertains the meanings of the words, expressions and sentences in relation to one another.

Despite the circular nature of the interpretative exercise though, an interpreter must begin somewhere—with an objectively accepted basis or predicate from which they may launch their logical exploration as to legislative purpose and statutory effect. As Mason P stated in House of Peace Pty Ltd v Bankstown City Council [2000] 48 NSWLR 498 above, dictionaries provide the range of meanings and therefore, offer a starting ground from which to begin the interpretative endeavour. Per Dixon J in Herbert Adams Pty Ltd v FCT (1932) 47 CLR 222 at 228-9, it is always easier to show that a word has a wider meaning than a narrower one, as there is no loss of meaning involved in adopting the broader definition. In this sense, the interpretative exercise in ascertaining the meaning of “ordinary and natural” words is one of peeling away meaning by reference to the statutory context in which they appears–the noscitur a sociis rule. The meaning is so narrowed by reference to the syntactical construction of the statutory phrase, as noted by Brennan CJ, Dawson, Toohey, Gaudron and McHugh JJ in Agfa Gevaert Agfa Gevaert (1996) 186 CLR 389 above.

A court cannot therefore be primarily guided by dictionary definitions as these are simply starting points; often ones which serve to confirm the range of meanings understood by those sitting on the bench, as stated by Kitto J in NSW Associated Blue-Metal Quarries v FCT (1956) 94 CLR 509 cited earlier. They provide evidence of a socially accepted range of usage in which the word is employed and from which the court may, with regard to the statutory context, narrow down such meaning in order to ascertain the legislative purpose the word expresses.